Battle of Smolensk Konstantin Rokossovsky

battle of smolensk diagram

the battle of smolensk commenced on july 10 when army group center began advancing on broad front north , south banks of dnepr river, beyond bend begins southward flow.

the 9th army attacked north-east toward veliki luki. 3rd panzer group under general hermann hoth struck east @ vitebsk , attacked along land bridge separates west dvina , dnepr rivers aim of enveloping smolensk north. heinz guderian s 2nd panzer group pushed toward smolensk directly through orsha , bypassed mogilev ultimate objective of making deep penetration far rear of soviet front line beyond elnya , toward moscow.

despite insubordination during battle of dubno, rokossovsky ordered moscow on july 13 take command of remnants of 4th army serve under marshal timoshenko had replaced disgraced d. g. pavlov western front commander on july 2, shortly after , majority of staff had been tried , shot in wake of disaster @ frontier.

on 15 july, same day rokossovsky restored rank of lieutenant general rank had held previous arrest, major general funck s 7th panzer division 3rd panzer group arrived @ yartsevo behind smolensk. next day motorized infantry 2nd panzer group forced of soviet defenders smolensk reducing gap between 2nd , 3rd panzer group s less 20 kilometers. 16th, 19th , 20th soviet armies threatened impending encirclement , strung out along north bank of river contained in triangle between vitebsk north-west, yartsevo north-east, , smolensk south.

with front rapidly deteriorating timoshenko released rokossovsky 4th army (a command had assumed in name only) , gave him task of assembling stopgap formation called group yartsevo deal emergency presented sudden appearance of 7th panzer @ yartsevo. ad hoc operational group defend bridgeheads of vop river, tributary of dnepr, , prevent southern , northern wings of panzer envelopment converging @ dnepr.

collapse seemed imminent. stalin, unmoved, reiterated demand timoshenko smolensk should not surrendered , called evacuation attitude of front line commanders of besieged armies criminally treasonous . rather retreat, timoshenko s armies stand ground , attempt recapture smolensk.

group yartsevo in theory large army sized formation when rokossovsky arrived @ timoshenko s headquarters on evening of 17th, in fact in charge of own small staff, 2 quad anti-aircraft machine guns mounted on trucks , radio van. @ first, rokossovsky had resort pulling fighting group reserve units , retreating stragglers, on coming days became more substantial force. retreating regiments , divisions 44th rifle corps filtered out of smolensk pocket , transferred command , fresh forces arrived reserve—the 107th tank division (formerly 69th motorized division trans-baikal military district) , 101st tank division equipped 220 outdated functional tanks.

what commenced confusing seesaw battle control of smolensk saw portions of city change hands several times on next week, while rokossovsky s group held door open , harassed advanced german panzer formations.

then began going on offense delivering blows against germans, first in 1 sector , in another, scoring appreciable tactical success, helped strengthen discipline among troops , strengthened confidence of officers , men, saw beat enemy, meant lot @ time.

our activity apparently puzzled enemy command, encountered resistance not expected; saw our troops not fought attacked (even if not successfully). tended create exaggerated idea of our forces in sector, , enemy failed take advantage of great superiority. — konstantin rokossovsky

day day, rokossovsky s forces became stronger. smolensk pocket deflated under german pressure rokossovsky able press service retreating soldiers , formations slipped out of pocket , employed them reinforcing perimeter of yartsevo corridor. eventually, 38th rifle division handed on rokossovsky when timoshenko rationalized command of shrinking formations in smolensk pocket disbanding ivan konev s 19th army.

the germans faced dilemma of both containing encircled armies, , dealing rokossovsky s burgeoning forces east. 7th panzer joined 12th panzer @ yartsevo, while 20th held down northern flank. many panzer divisions tied down in defensive position containing soviet activity both inside , outside of pocket, of offensive punch of panzer groups blunted.

even though group yartsevo had managed halt advance of hoth s 3rd panzer group @ yartsevo, guderian s 2nd panzer group continued advance south of dnepr on rokossovsky s left flank becoming more tangible threat each passing day. on 18 july, guderian s 10th panzer division entered town of elnya 70 km south yartsevo , captured on 20th.

but on july 19, german operational objectives smolensk had changed when hitler issued führer directive 33, ordering wehrmacht temporarily cease drive on moscow, wheel south , finish off soviet defenders holding onto kiev in ukraine. result, guderian s intended deep penetration operationally obsolete, , field marshal von bock became intent on mopping soviet defenders @ smolensk, panzer groups released army group south. impatient guderian s slow going von bock urged guderian drive north , close yartsevo corridor. in anticipation of development, rokossovsky had deployed 107th tank division hold area south of dnepr , when 10th panzer undertook unsupported attack northward toward dorogobuzh elnya, repulsed after 3 days of heavy fighting. situation temporarily stabilized.

on july 20, zhukov ordered general counterattack aim of relieving encircled armies, , beginning on july 21 attacks began along entire front, , continued number of days in uncoordinated fashion. meanwhile, defenders in pocket increased efforts recapture smolensk. attacks made south against flank of guderian s advanced forces @ elnya , roslavl, , north of yartsevo against hoth s 2nd panzer group. deep cavalry penetrations made behind german front behind mogilev disrupting logistics. uncoordinated attacks had effect of distracting german advance several days intense battles took place increasing casualties on both sides. on 24th rokossovky s temporarily drove funk s 7th panzer yartsevo.

unsupported infantry wehrmacht advanced panzer formations taking inordinate casualties. make further headway, both hoth , guderian needed bring infantry forward disentangle mobile forces containment operations, , free them attack, slowing pace of advance.

by 25 july, guderian had been able free considerable tank forces defensive duties, , mobilized 17th panzer division concerted effort advance north , clear rokossovsky tenuous position, 17th panzer still unable reach dnepr , close pocket. nonetheless, under attack north , south rokossovsky unable prevent hoth s 20th motorized infantry capturing bridgeheads on dnepr on 27th sealing pocket. encircled armies fought intense breakout battles, , on 28th timoshenko ordered rokossovsky reopen corridor recapturing bridgeheads , while unable regain control of river crossings, 101st tank division recaptured yartsevo on 29th , held few critical days.

despite strenuous efforts on next week, rokossovsky not able secure link armies in pocket, intense soviet activity kept germans consolidating front allowing elements of encircled 16th army effect breakout. 4 august front had stabilized , defending armies within pocket ceased resistance or had ceased exist.

rokossovsky credited slowing german attack, , holding yartsevo corridor open long enough prevent capture , destruction of considerable numbers of soviet troops. broader consequences of soviet resistance @ smolensk evident in führer directive no. 34, issued on 30 july 1941:

the development of situation in last few days, appearance of strong enemy forces on front , flanks of army group centre, supply position, , need give 2nd , 3rd armoured groups ten days rehabilitate units, make necessary postpone moment further tasks , objectives laid down in directive 33 of 19th july , in supplement of 23rd july. — adolf hitler