Differences from Buddhism Advaita Vedanta

1 differences buddhism

1.1 atman , anatta
1.2 epistemology
1.3 ontology
1.4 shankara on buddhism

differences buddhism
atman , anatta

advaita vedanta holds premise, soul exists, , soul (or self, atman) self evident truth . buddhism, in contrast, holds premise, atman not exist, , an-atman (or anatta, non-self) self evident .

in buddhism, anatta (pali, sanskrit cognate an-atman) concept in human beings , living creatures, there no eternal, essential , absolute called soul, self or atman . buddhist philosophy rejects concept , doctrines associated atman, call atman illusion (maya), asserting instead theory of no-self , no-soul . schools of buddhism, earliest days, have denied existence of self, soul in core philosophical , ontological texts. in contrast advaita, describes knowing 1 s own soul identical brahman path nirvana, in soteriological themes buddhism has defined nirvana blissful state when person realizes or has no self, no soul .

some buddhist texts chronologically placed in 1st millennium of common era, such mahayana tradition s tathāgatagarbha sūtras suggest self-like concepts, variously called tathagatagarbha or buddha nature. these have been controversial idea in buddhism, , eternal self concepts have been rejected. in modern era studies, scholars such wayman , wayman state these self-like concepts neither self nor sentient being, nor soul, nor personality. scholars posit tathagatagarbha sutras written promote buddhism non-buddhists.

epistemology

the epistemological foundations of buddhism , advaita vedanta different. buddhism accepts 2 valid means reliable , correct knowledge – perception , inference, while advaita vedanta accepts 6 (described elsewhere in article). however, buddhists in history, have argued buddhist scriptures reliable source of spiritual knowledge, corresponding advaita s Śabda pramana, buddhists have treated scriptures form of inference method.

ontology

advaita vedanta posits substance ontology, ontology holds underlying change , impermanence of empirical reality unchanging , permanent absolute reality, eternal substance calls atman-brahman. in substance ontology, other philosophies, there exist universal, particulars , specific properties , interaction of particulars create events , processes.

in contrast, buddhism posits process ontology, called event ontology . according buddhist thought, particularly after rise of ancient mahayana buddhism scholarship, there neither empirical nor absolute permanent reality , ontology can explained process. there system of relations , interdependent phenomena (pratitya samutpada) in buddhist ontology, no stable persistent identities, no eternal universals nor particulars. thought , memories mental constructions , fluid processes without real observer, personal agency or cognizer in buddhism. in contrast, in advaita vedanta, other schools of hinduism, concept of self (atman) real on-looker, personal agent , cognizer.

the pali abdhidhamma , theravada buddhism considered existence dhamma, , left ontological questions reality , nature of dhamma unexplained.

according renard, advaita s theory of 3 levels of reality built on 2 levels of reality found in madhyamika.

shankara on buddhism

a central concern shankara, in objections against buddhism, perceives nihilism of buddhists. shankara states there must beyond cognition, namely cognizer, asserts self-evident atman or witness. buddhism, according shankara, denies cognizer. considers notion of brahman pure knowledge , quintessence of positive reality.

the teachings in brahma sutras, states shankara, differ both buddhist realists , buddhist idealists. shankara elaborates on these arguments against various schools of buddhism, partly presenting refutations standard in time, , partly offering own objections. shankara s original contribution in explaining difference between advaita , buddhism argument identity , argument witness . in shankara s view, buddhist internally inconsistent in theories, because reservoir-consciousness [they] set up, being momentary, no better ordinary consciousness. or, if [they] allow reservoir-consciousness lasting, [they] destroy [their] theory of momentariness. in response idealists, notes alaya-vijnana, or store-house consciousness, runs counter buddhist theory of momentariness. regard sunyavada (madhyamaka), shankara states being contradictory valid means of knowledge, have not thought worth while refute , common sense (loka-vyavahara) cannot denied without discovery of other truth .

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