Strategic developments Battle of Verdun

after german invasion of france had been halted @ first battle of marne in september 1914, war of movement ended @ battle of yser , first battle of ypres. germans built field fortifications hold ground captured in 1914 , french began siege warfare break through german defences , recover lost territory. in late 1914 , in 1915, offensives on western front had failed gain ground , been extremely costly in casualties. according memoirs written after war, chief of german general staff, erich von falkenhayn, believed although victory might no longer achieved decisive battle, french army still defeated if suffered sufficient number of casualties. falkenhayn offered 5 corps strategic reserve offensive @ verdun @ beginning of february 1916 attack on east bank of meuse. falkenhayn considered unlikely french complacent verdun; thought might send reserves there , begin counter-offensive elsewhere or fight hold verdun while british launched relief offensive. after war, kaiser , colonel tappen, operations officer @ oberste heeresleitung (ohl, general headquarters), wrote falkenhayn believed last possibility likely.

by seizing or threatening capture verdun, germans anticipated french send reserves, have attack secure german defensive positions, supported powerful artillery reserve , destroyed. in gorlice–tarnów offensive (1 may – 19 september 1915), german , austro-hungarian armies attacked russian defences frontally, after pulverising them large amounts of heavy artillery. during second battle of champagne (herbstschlacht autumn battle) of 25 september – 6 november 1915, french suffered extraordinary casualties german heavy artillery, falkenhayn considered offered way out of dilemma of material inferiority , growing strength of allies. in north, british relief offensive wear down british reserves, no decisive effect create conditions german counter-offensive near arras.

hints falkenhayn s thinking picked dutch military intelligence , passed on british in december. german strategy create favourable operational situation without mass attack, had been costly , ineffective when had been tried franco-british, relying on power of heavy artillery inflict mass losses. limited offensive @ verdun lead destruction of french strategic reserve in fruitless counter-attacks , defeat of british reserves in futile relief offensive, leading french accepting separate peace. if french refused negotiate, second phase of strategy begin in german armies attack terminally weakened franco-british armies, mop remains of french armies , expel british europe. fulfil strategy, falkenhayn needed hold enough of strategic reserve anglo-french relief offensives , conduct counter-offensive, limited number of divisions sent 5th army @ verdun, unternehmen gericht (operation judgement).

the fortified region of verdun (rfv) lay in salient formed during german invasion of 1914. commander-in-chief of french army, general joseph joffre, had concluded swift capture of belgian fortresses @ battle of liège , @ siege of namur in 1914 fixed defences had been made obsolete german siege guns. in directive of general staff of 5 august 1915, rfv stripped of 54 artillery batteries , 128,000 rounds of ammunition. plans demolish forts douaumont , vaux deny them germans made , 5,000 kilograms (11,000 lb) of explosives had been laid time of german offensive on 21 february. 18 large forts , other batteries around verdun left fewer 300 guns , small reserve of ammunition while garrisons had been reduced small maintenance crews. railway line south verdun had been cut during battle of flirey in 1914, loss of saint-mihiel; line west verdun paris cut @ aubréville in mid-july 1915 german 3rd army, had attacked southwards through argonne forest of year.

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