World War II Konstantin Rokossovsky

1 world war ii

1.1 1941: operation barbarossa; dubno, smolensk , moscow

1.1.1 battle of dubno
1.1.2 battle of smolensk
1.1.3 battle of moscow
1.1.4 1942: operation fall blau

1.1.4.1 retreat don
1.1.4.2 operation uranus
1.1.4.3 stalingrad


1.1.5 1943: kursk
1.1.6 1944: operation bagration & warsaw uprising


1.2 postwar
1.3 dates of rank

world war ii

konstantin rokossovsky s place in history military leader established in war known among russians great patriotic war began german invasion of soviet union on june 22, 1941. rose being disgraced officer , former prisoner charged treason, through rank of major general, become marshal of soviet union, put in charge of victory parade in moscow @ conclusion of war in 1945. played major role in every strategically important operation led soviet victory on germany during world war ii.

german army machine, , machines can broken! — konstantin rokossovsky

1941: operation barbarossa; dubno, smolensk , moscow

battle of dubno

georgi zhukov (middle) , konstantin rokossovsky (right), greeting bernard montgomery (back camera) @ brandenburg gate, berlin, germany, 12 jul 1945

when nazi germany attacked soviet union in june 1941 rokossovsky serving commander of 9th mechanized corps 35th , 20th tank divisions, , 131st motorized division under command.

he engaged in tank battles raged around lutsk-dubno-brody triangle, known battle of brody — soviet counter-attack significant soviet tank operation of stages of operation barbarossa.

the battle involved large scale attack involving 5 mechanized corps aimed @ penetrating german line in direction of lublin based on plan developed before hostilities commenced. orders attack zhukov met little enthusiasm southwestern front staff wanted maintain defensive posture. nonetheless attack proceeded. operation met numerous difficulties in mobilization, coordination, communication, transportation , execution scored initial successes, parried quick action of von rundstedt s army group south in ukraine , ended in destruction of of participating soviet forces.

upon receiving orders rokossovsky, divisions stationed far rear of frontier, had commandeer trucks local reserve carry munitions, , mount of infantry on tanks while rest forced walk, splitting forces. consequence, forces behind schedule , advanced guard able meet 26 june jump off , , entered fray piecemeal. orders move forward , take positions around lutsk north of town of dubno in co-ordination 19th mechanized corps under n. v. feklenko, , attack south-west, while mechanized corps of 6th army attacked northward brody meet them, intent of cutting off advance of 11th panzer division east of dubno.

on 25 june, rokossosky s 131st motorized infantry driven out of position @ lutsk 14th panzer division, 35th , 20th tank divisions able cobble advance forces cut lutsk-dubno road, though full force had not yet arrived on battlefield. on same day elements of 19th mechanized corps, operating east out of rovno had succeeded in temporarily driving rearguard of 11th panzer division dubno cutting off advance units. in response 13th panzer division attacked south lutsk next day clearing rokossovsky s forces road , allowing german infantry recapture dubno, while drove off 19th mechanized , captured rovno in rokossovsky s rear.

as german resistance stiffened, mikhail kirponos commander of southwestern front issued instructions cease offensive operations countermanded superior chief of general staff g.k. zhukov visiting headquarters. zhukov insisted counter-attack continue against counterarguments. result, rokossovsky s command bombarded conflicting orders. according lieutenant-general d.i. rjabyshev, rokossovsky expressed no ambivalence proposed counteroffensive , refused direct order, ending dispute between zhukov , kirponos:

we had once again received order counterattack. however, enemy outnumbered such degree, took on personal responsibility of ordering halt counteroffensive , meet enemy in prepared defences. — konstantin rokossovsky

because of this, rjabyshev s 8th mechanized, had scored successes operating out of brody, in effect continuing attack south expectation of support rokossovsky, had stood down forces, , did not arrive north. neither aware of fact, because there no available direct communication between individual corps, example of how endemic communication problems helped foil soviet efforts.

throughout next days rokossovsky s forces put considerable pressure on germans @ lutsk , tried recapture rovno in rear, while stopping advance of 14th panzer ambushing them 85mm anti-tank guns @ close range effect. observed in memoirs terrain off road wooded , swampy, keeping german advance road. artillery regiment of 20th tank division deployed newly issued 85mm guns cover road , direct fire repulsed advancing panzers.

the battles around lutsk, dubno , brody fought 8th, 9th , 19th mechanized corps notable among soviet operations in day of barbarossa because southwestern front able organize active operations, unlike sectors of front german assault met operational paralysis, , bought time reorganize defense along line of old polish border.

sporadic attempts made close widening gap between soviet 5th , 6th armies, germans advanced on kiev, soviet tank forces fraction of former strength. july 7, rokossovsky s 9th mechanized corps had been reduced 64 tanks, out of original compliment of 316.

battle of smolensk

while rokossovsky , fellow mechanized corps commanders of 5th , 6th army had been interdicting army group south s advance in ukraine, complete disorder , panic gripped soviet forces in byelorussia, disabling impact of poor organization, logistics , communications exponentially greater. red army collapsed under coordinated attack of field marshal von bock s army group center. within seventeen days, during battle of białystok–minsk 3 quarters of d.g. pavlov s western front put out of action; dispersed, captured or killed. of initial compliment of 625,000 soldiers 290,000 taken prisoner , 1,500 guns , 2,500 tanks captured or destroyed. june 30 germans had reached approaches of dnepr river bend river departs east–west flow, , heads south. way open strategically important city of smolensk, marshal simon timoshenko reassembling shattered western front on new defense line.

battle of smolensk diagram

the battle of smolensk commenced on july 10 when army group center began advancing on broad front north , south banks of dnepr river, beyond bend begins southward flow.

the 9th army attacked north-east toward veliki luki. 3rd panzer group under general hermann hoth struck east @ vitebsk , attacked along land bridge separates west dvina , dnepr rivers aim of enveloping smolensk north. heinz guderian s 2nd panzer group pushed toward smolensk directly through orsha , bypassed mogilev ultimate objective of making deep penetration far rear of soviet front line beyond elnya , toward moscow.

despite insubordination during battle of dubno, rokossovsky ordered moscow on july 13 take command of remnants of 4th army serve under marshal timoshenko had replaced disgraced d. g. pavlov western front commander on july 2, shortly after , majority of staff had been tried , shot in wake of disaster @ frontier.

on 15 july, same day rokossovsky restored rank of lieutenant general rank had held previous arrest, major general funck s 7th panzer division 3rd panzer group arrived @ yartsevo behind smolensk. next day motorized infantry 2nd panzer group forced of soviet defenders smolensk reducing gap between 2nd , 3rd panzer group s less 20 kilometers. 16th, 19th , 20th soviet armies threatened impending encirclement , strung out along north bank of river contained in triangle between vitebsk north-west, yartsevo north-east, , smolensk south.

with front rapidly deteriorating timoshenko released rokossovsky 4th army (a command had assumed in name only) , gave him task of assembling stopgap formation called group yartsevo deal emergency presented sudden appearance of 7th panzer @ yartsevo. ad hoc operational group defend bridgeheads of vop river, tributary of dnepr, , prevent southern , northern wings of panzer envelopment converging @ dnepr.

collapse seemed imminent. stalin, unmoved, reiterated demand timoshenko smolensk should not surrendered , called evacuation attitude of front line commanders of besieged armies criminally treasonous . rather retreat, timoshenko s armies stand ground , attempt recapture smolensk.

group yartsevo in theory large army sized formation when rokossovsky arrived @ timoshenko s headquarters on evening of 17th, in fact in charge of own small staff, 2 quad anti-aircraft machine guns mounted on trucks , radio van. @ first, rokossovsky had resort pulling fighting group reserve units , retreating stragglers, on coming days became more substantial force. retreating regiments , divisions 44th rifle corps filtered out of smolensk pocket , transferred command , fresh forces arrived reserve—the 107th tank division (formerly 69th motorized division trans-baikal military district) , 101st tank division equipped 220 outdated functional tanks.

what commenced confusing seesaw battle control of smolensk saw portions of city change hands several times on next week, while rokossovsky s group held door open , harassed advanced german panzer formations.

then began going on offense delivering blows against germans, first in 1 sector , in another, scoring appreciable tactical success, helped strengthen discipline among troops , strengthened confidence of officers , men, saw beat enemy, meant lot @ time.

our activity apparently puzzled enemy command, encountered resistance not expected; saw our troops not fought attacked (even if not successfully). tended create exaggerated idea of our forces in sector, , enemy failed take advantage of great superiority. — konstantin rokossovsky

day day, rokossovsky s forces became stronger. smolensk pocket deflated under german pressure rokossovsky able press service retreating soldiers , formations slipped out of pocket , employed them reinforcing perimeter of yartsevo corridor. eventually, 38th rifle division handed on rokossovsky when timoshenko rationalized command of shrinking formations in smolensk pocket disbanding ivan konev s 19th army.

the germans faced dilemma of both containing encircled armies, , dealing rokossovsky s burgeoning forces east. 7th panzer joined 12th panzer @ yartsevo, while 20th held down northern flank. many panzer divisions tied down in defensive position containing soviet activity both inside , outside of pocket, of offensive punch of panzer groups blunted.

even though group yartsevo had managed halt advance of hoth s 3rd panzer group @ yartsevo, guderian s 2nd panzer group continued advance south of dnepr on rokossovsky s left flank becoming more tangible threat each passing day. on 18 july, guderian s 10th panzer division entered town of elnya 70 km south yartsevo , captured on 20th.

but on july 19, german operational objectives smolensk had changed when hitler issued führer directive 33, ordering wehrmacht temporarily cease drive on moscow, wheel south , finish off soviet defenders holding onto kiev in ukraine. result, guderian s intended deep penetration operationally obsolete, , field marshal von bock became intent on mopping soviet defenders @ smolensk, panzer groups released army group south. impatient guderian s slow going von bock urged guderian drive north , close yartsevo corridor. in anticipation of development, rokossovsky had deployed 107th tank division hold area south of dnepr , when 10th panzer undertook unsupported attack northward toward dorogobuzh elnya, repulsed after 3 days of heavy fighting. situation temporarily stabilized.

on july 20, zhukov ordered general counterattack aim of relieving encircled armies, , beginning on july 21 attacks began along entire front, , continued number of days in uncoordinated fashion. meanwhile, defenders in pocket increased efforts recapture smolensk. attacks made south against flank of guderian s advanced forces @ elnya , roslavl, , north of yartsevo against hoth s 2nd panzer group. deep cavalry penetrations made behind german front behind mogilev disrupting logistics. uncoordinated attacks had effect of distracting german advance several days intense battles took place increasing casualties on both sides. on 24th rokossovky s temporarily drove funk s 7th panzer yartsevo.

unsupported infantry wehrmacht advanced panzer formations taking inordinate casualties. make further headway, both hoth , guderian needed bring infantry forward disentangle mobile forces containment operations, , free them attack, slowing pace of advance.

by 25 july, guderian had been able free considerable tank forces defensive duties, , mobilized 17th panzer division concerted effort advance north , clear rokossovsky tenuous position, 17th panzer still unable reach dnepr , close pocket. nonetheless, under attack north , south rokossovsky unable prevent hoth s 20th motorized infantry capturing bridgeheads on dnepr on 27th sealing pocket. encircled armies fought intense breakout battles, , on 28th timoshenko ordered rokossovsky reopen corridor recapturing bridgeheads , while unable regain control of river crossings, 101st tank division recaptured yartsevo on 29th , held few critical days.

despite strenuous efforts on next week, rokossovsky not able secure link armies in pocket, intense soviet activity kept germans consolidating front allowing elements of encircled 16th army effect breakout. 4 august front had stabilized , defending armies within pocket ceased resistance or had ceased exist.

rokossovsky credited slowing german attack, , holding yartsevo corridor open long enough prevent capture , destruction of considerable numbers of soviet troops. broader consequences of soviet resistance @ smolensk evident in führer directive no. 34, issued on 30 july 1941:

the development of situation in last few days, appearance of strong enemy forces on front , flanks of army group centre, supply position, , need give 2nd , 3rd armoured groups ten days rehabilitate units, make necessary postpone moment further tasks , objectives laid down in directive 33 of 19th july , in supplement of 23rd july. — adolf hitler

battle of moscow

in september 1941 stalin appointed rokossovsky command of 16th army, first soviet army group composed entirely of soldiers serving in shtrafbats (soviet penal battalions); stalin reportedly viewed rokossovsky, former disgraced gulag inmate had barely escaped imprisonment alive, perfect candidate lead brutal penal units, going far wryly comment on rokossovsky s missing fingernails (pulled out nkvd torturers during imprisonment) @ meeting assigned command. rokossovsky s army ordered defend approaches moscow, , under direct command of general georgy zhukov, former subordinate. 16th army (later renamed 11th guards army) played key role in battle of moscow when deployed along main axis of german advance along volokolamsk highway central junction of bitter fighting during german winter offensive of 1941 (operation typhoon), subsequent soviet counter-attack of 1941–42.

on november 18, during last-ditch efforts of wehrmacht encircle moscow in 1941, general rokossovsky, soldiers under heavy pressure hoepner s 4th panzer group, asked immediate superior, zhukov, if withdraw 16th army more advantageous positions. zhukov categorically refused. rokossovsky went on zhukov s head, , spoke directly marshal boris shaposhnikov, chief of general staff in zhukov s place; reviewing situation shaposhnikov ordered withdrawal. zhukov reacted @ once. revoked order of superior officer, , ordered rokossovsky hold position. in immediate aftermath, rokossovsky s army pushed aside , 3rd , 4th panzer groups able gain strategically important positions north of moscow, marked high point of german advance upon moscow. throughout operation typhoon, rokossovsky s 16th army had taken brunt of german effort capture moscow.

1942: operation fall blau

in march 1942 rokossovsky badly injured shell splinter. rumored valentina serova mistress of rokossovsky during time. while s true serova, working hospital volunteer, met rokossovski several times while recovering wound, there no evidence lovers. rokossovski had mistress @ time, dr. lt. galina talanova, whom had daughter in 1945. after 2 months in moscow hospital rokossovsky reunited briefly 16th army.

retreat don

during 1942 wehrmacht commenced operation fall blau , switched axis of offensive moscow , attacked southward eastern ukraine towards don-volga river line, rostov, voronezh, stalingrad , caucasus beyond. there germans hoped secure fresh supplies of oil fuel armies. unlike days of 1941 stiffening soviet army maintained relatively order in retreat, backing along defensive line along don river.

on 13 july 1942 rokossvsky given first operational level command, sign of growing stature. battles of smolensk , moscow had no measure resulted in red army victory front line formations under command central frustrating wehrmacht efforts achieve same , reflected in stalin s decision make him commander of bryansk front stavka expected main line of german attack renewed against moscow in 1942—rokossovsky trusted officer counted on in tight squeeze.

as german offensive turned south, , toward voronezh, bryansk sector turned out quiet stavka shuffled 38th army general vatutin s voronezh front, during heated battle of voronezh, germans attempted ford don river, , compromise entire soviet don river defense. rokossovsky recounts in memoirs during summer stalin phoned him ask whether did not find situation dull liking , recalled moscow undertake command of new operation:

plan concentrate strong force (no less 3 combined armies , several armoured corps) on flank of enemy occupying country between don , volga purpose of counter-attacking south , south-east vicinity of serafimovich.

subsequent events delayed attack , shelved, later resurrected operation uranus vatutin playing lead role, walsh asserts rokossovsky being selected lead attack symptomatic of standing , importance of location indicator of significant, impending soviet operations.

operation uranus

by fall of 1942 german army had pulled along new soviet defense @ don , volga rivers, centered @ stalingrad, , had broken through south of rostov toward strategic oil centers of tblisi , baku. stalin determined stalingrad should not fall, , red army given strict orders hold city @ cost. battle of stalingrad became struggle control of city drew in combatants both sides in brutal house house fighting.

operation uranus

on september 28, 1942, @ zhukov s urging, rokossovsky given overall command of 65th army (4th tank army), 24th army , 66th army, brought don front part of stalin s criticized reorganization of southern front in preparation planned soviet counterattack @ stalingrad: operation uranus . put rokossovky s armies directly opposite xi, viii , xiv corps of 6th army, including 16th panzer , 14th panzer divisions, of destroyed in ensuing battle.

with german forces heavily engaged @ stalingrad , spread thinly due deep penetrations caucasus, wehrmacht increasingly reliant on romanian , italian allies cover flanks of extended line, on north along don, , south along volga. operation uranus kicked off on november 17 intention of making double envelopment of paulus s men @ stalingrad breaking through flanks. southwestern front commanded general vatutin overwhelmed 3rd romanian army north of rokossovsky s don front, while yeryomenko s stalingrad front began own attack south of stalingrad. rokossovsky s don front played largely subordinate role in main attack, 66th army supported vatutin s attack north outflanking left extreme of german line met romanian 3rd army, while 24th , 65th squeezed german defenders—pinning them in place pincers of main attacks rapidly enveloped them.

in less week, in face of deteriorating weather , blizzard conditions, soviet forces had sealed gap behind stalingrad, , had begun reinforce investment around city in order prevent attempted escape. no organized effort made 6th army break out, , operation winter storm , mid december german effort relieve encircled army, failed break soviet defenses. after, soviets launched operation little saturn , consolidated position.

stalingrad

on december 28 stalin gave rokossovsky task of mopping stalingrad pocket. had @ disposal 212,000 men, 6,500 guns, 2,500 tanks, , 300 aircraft, used against assortment of 200,000 defenders short on food, fuel, , ammunition, including russian hiwis , romanians , germans; in 1 example, half 6th army s 297th infantry division fighting force russian, artillery detachment rationed 1 , half shells day. on january 8, 1943, rokossovsky ordered cease-fire , sent delegation offer terms of surrender paulus did not respond, , resistance continued better part of month.

on january 10, don front launched operation ring reduce stalingrad pocket beginning 55-minute barrage 7000 rocket launchers, artillery , mortars. defenders fought tenaciously, lines collapsed, causing don front 26,000 casualties, , destroying half tanks in first 3 days of operation.

on january 15 rokossovsky promoted rank of colonel general.

on january 16 main airfield used supply beleaguered 6th army fell, , after pause of few days, offensive renewed capturing last operational airfield , driving german city proper on january 22.

rokossovsky interrogates paulus @ don front hq: general rokossovsky, marshal voronov, translator nikolay dyatlenko , paulus (left right)

on same day general paulus asked hitler permission surrender refused. on 26 january soviets had broken surrounded germans 2 pockets, , on january 31, southern pocket collapsed , paulus surrendered. within 4 days last significant group of defenders surrendered rokossovky s command, ending battle marked high-water mark of german advance during soviet-german war.

troops of don front @ 4pm on february 2nd, 1943 completed rout , destruction of encircled group of enemy forces in stalingrad. twenty-two divisions have been destroyed or taken prisoner. — konstantin rokossovsky

1943: kursk

german plan of attack

after victory @ stalingrad russian forces advanced position created bulge 150 km deep , 250 km wide german line, around city of kursk. subsequently became known kursk salient. rokossovsky command moved north of salient , re-designated new front, twinned voronezh front, holding south approaches.

in february 1943 rokossovsky wrote in diary: m appointed commander of central front. means stalin has entrusted me play key part in summer kursk campaign.

both red army , wehrmacht prepared make decisive offensive in summer of 1943 @ kursk. germans planned drive 2 thrusts 1 through each flank of salient , unite them @ kursk in order cut off substantial soviet forces, recover strategic loss @ stalingrad, , curtail further russian advance. russians, alert coming attack put offensive plans aside , prepared defense in depth mass antitank units in prepared positions.

in late june 1 german bomb load in night raid hit rokossovskii s hq, , escaped because on whim had decided set signals group in officers mess. after that, central front hq went underground in bunker in garden of former monastery.

the german offensive, code named operation citadel , scheduled begin in may attack delayed several times in order bring fresh panzer formations equipped tiger s , panther tanks , latest assault guns. these delays allowed greater soviet preparation. not until july wehrmacht operations in kursk salient got underway.

the resulting battle 1 of largest tank battles in world war ii, massive losses of men , equipment on both sides. commander of central front, rokossovsky s force faced determined attack army group center s 9th army under walter model, including several tank formations augmented newest tiger tanks in battalion strength. rokossovsky part had organized defenses 3 defensive belts. after initial german assault, rokossovsky ordered counter-attacks russian armor suffered badly in face of new german heavy tiger tanks, , went on defensive. despite this, germans bogged down in heavily mined terrain , antitank defenses, , rokossovsky able reinforce.

needless russians exploited victory full. there no more periods of quiet on eastern front. on, enemy in undisputed possession of initiative. — heinz guderian

the central front renamed 1st belorussian front, commanded during soviet advance through byelorussia (belarus) , poland.

1944: operation bagration & warsaw uprising

a famous incident consistently reported various sources in different versions during planning in 1944 of operation bagration, rokossovsky disagreed stalin, demanded in accordance soviet war practice single break-through of german frontline. rokossovsky held firm in argument 2 points of break-through. stalin ordered rokossovsky go , think on 3 times, every time returned , gave same answer 2 break-throughs, comrade stalin, 2 break-throughs . after third time stalin remained silent, walked on rokossovsky , put hand on shoulder. tense moment followed whole room waited stalin rip epaulette rokossovsky s shoulder; instead, stalin said confidence speaks sound judgement , , ordered attack go forward according rokossovsky s plan. battle successful , rokossovsky s reputation assured. after crushing german army group centre in belarus, rokossovsky s armies reached east bank of vistula opposite warsaw mid-1944. these victories gained rank of marshal of soviet union. stalin once said: have no suvorov, rokossovsky bagration .

while rokossovsky s forces stood stalled on vistula, warsaw uprising (august–october, 1944) broke out in city, led polish home army (ak) on orders of polish government in exile in london. rokossovsky did not order reinforcement insurgents. there has been speculation rokossovsky s personal views on decision. maintain that, communications badly stretched , enemy pressure against northern flank mounting, committing forces warsaw have been disastrous.

in november 1944, rokossovsky transferred 2nd belorussian front, advanced east prussia , across northern poland mouth of oder @ stettin (now szczecin). on 3 may 1945 linked british field marshal bernard montgomery s 2nd army in wismar, germany while forces of zhukov , ivan koniev captured berlin, ending war.

in july 1945, he, zhukov , several other soviet officers bestowed order of bath in ceremony @ brandenburg gate, in berlin.

postwar

as 1 of prominent soviet military commanders of second world war, rokossovsky present @ victory parade in red square in moscow in 1945, riding on black stallion next marshal georgy zhukov.

after end of war rokossovsky remained in command of soviet forces in poland (northern group of forces). 4 years later, in october 1949 establishment of government under bolesław bierut in poland, rokossovsky, on stalin s orders, became polish minister of national defense, additional title of marshal of poland. rokossovsky, several thousand soviet officers placed in charge of polish military units, either commanding officers or advisors.

in 1952 became deputy chairman of council of ministers of people s republic of poland. although rokossovsky polish ancestry, had not lived in poland 35 years , poles regarded him russian , soviet emissary in country. rokossovsky himself bitterly put it: in russia, m pole, in poland call me russian .

rokossovsky on 1976 soviet stamp

rokossovsky played key role in regime s suppression of independent poland through stalinization , sovietization in general, , in polish army in particular. de facto supreme commander of polish army, introduced various methods suppression of anti-soviet activity, real or imagined. among notorious labour battalions of army, able-bodied men found socially or politically insecure or guilty of having families abroad drafted. estimated 200,000 men forced work in these labour camps in hazardous conditions, in quarries, coal mines, , uranium mines, , 1,000 died in first days of labour , while tens of thousands became crippled. other groups targeted these repressive measures former soldiers of pre-war polish army wartime underground home army.

in june 1956 poznań protests against local working conditions , living standards, soviet occupation of poland, rokossovsky approved order send in military units. result of on 10,000 soldiers , 360 tanks crushed protesters, , @ least 74 civilians killed.

in wake of poznan riots , rehabilitation of formerly imprisoned communist reformer władysław gomułka in 1956, rokossovsky went moscow in failed attempt convince nikita khrushchev use force against polish state. however, gomułka managed negotiate soviets, , on new polish first secretary s insistence rokossovsky forced leave poland. returned soviet union, restored soviet ranks , honours; , in july 1957, following removal office of defence minister zhukov, nikita khrushchev appointed him deputy minister of defence , commander of transcaucasian military district. in 1958 became chief inspector of ministry of defence, post held until retirement in april 1962.

he died in august 1968, aged 71. ashes buried in kremlin wall necropolis on red square.

dates of rank

promoted major general, 4 june 1940
promoted lieutenant general, 14 july. 1941
promoted colonel general, 15 jan. 1943
promoted army general, 28 april 1943
promoted marshal of soviet union, 29 june 1944
declared marshal of poland 2 november 1949




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^ rokossovsky, konstantin . encyclopedia of world war ii, volume ii. 
^ antony beevor, 1999; john erickson (historian), road stalingrad, 1993 via stalingrad academy of street fighting archived 14 february 2008 @ wayback machine.
^ lotz, corinna. why stalingrad still matters . world win. 
^ beevor, antony (1998). stalingrad: fateful siege. artemis cooper. p. 353. 
^ beevor, antony (1998). stalingrad: fateful siege. artemis cooper. p. 356. 
^ konstantin rokossovsky . world war ii database. 
^ beevor, antony (1998). stalingrad: fateful siege. artemis cooper. pp. 364–394. 
^ russia @ war, 1941–1945 & werth 1964, p. 543.
^ *erickson, john (1999) [1983]. road berlin: stalin’s war germany: volume 2 (2 ed.). new haven: yale university press. p. 98. isbn 0-300-07813-7. 
^ clark, alan (1966). barbarossa: russian-german conflict 1941–1945. new york: morrow. p. 195. isbn 0-688-04268-6. oclc 40117106. 
^ * bergström, christer (2007). kursk — air battle: july 1943. burgess hill: chervron/ian allen. p. 121. isbn 978-1-903223-91-8. 
^ cite error: named reference rudenko invoked never defined (see page).
^ chris bellamy (2007). 18 . absolute war. london: panmacmillan. p. 610. isbn 978-0-330-51004-2. 
^ norman davies (1982). god s playground. new york: columbia university press. isbn 0-231-05353-3.  (also isbn 0-231-05351-7)
^ wiesław białkowski (1994). rokossowski – na ile polak? (rokossowski – how of pole?) (in polish). warsaw: alfa. p. 326. isbn 83-7001-755-x. 
^ paweł piotrowski; barbara polak (june 2001). Żołnierze, oficerowie, generałowie [soldiers, officers, generals]. biuletyn ipn (in polish). 6 (7/2001). issn 1641-9561. archived original on 22 march 2005. retrieved 2006-04-17. 
^ anna witalis zdrzenicka (2005). polski gułag. zapomniana krzywda powraca (polish gulag: forgotten lesion returns) . gazeta ogólnopolska (in polish). 1 (1). retrieved 2006-04-17. 
^ grzegorz ekiert; jan kubik (2001). rebellious civil society : popular protest , democratic consolidation in poland, 1989–1993. ann arbor: university of michigan press. pp. 27–29. isbn 0-472-08830-0. 
^ according official figures, in: maciej szewczyk (2005). poznański czerwiec 1956 . poznańczyk (in polish). retrieved 2006-04-17. 
^ wprost 24 – rezydent wolski
^ cite error: named reference :1 invoked never defined (see page).